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I. Introduction
Imagine you are a capital defense attorney. The jury has convicted
your client of capital murder in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and
sentenced him to life imprisonment during the sentencing phase. Although
in many capital cases you would consider this to be a victory, in this
particular instance you feel that a grave procedural error prejudiced your
client in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. You are convinced that if
this error had not occurred, the jury would not have convicted your client
of capital murder. Thus, you prepare an appeal seeking reversal of your
client's conviction and remand for a new trial. Just as you are about to file
the appeal, however, you pause for a moment and consider the possible
chain of events that the appeal could set into motion.
On one hand, the appeal could fail and your defendant's conviction
and life sentence would stand. However, given the strength of your
arguments supporting reversal, you conclude that the appellate court would
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likely agree to set your client's conviction aside and remand the case for new
trial. You predict that in a new trial free of procedural errors prejudicing
your client's case, the jury would decline to convict the defendant of capital
murder. But what if the jury were to convict your client of capital murder in
the guilt phase of the second trial despite the absence of the prejudicial error?
Could the prosecution lawfully seek the death penalty in the sentencing
phase of the second trial even though your client received a life sentence for
that very offense in the sentencing phase of the first trial?
The answer to this question turns on whether your client was "acquitted"
of the death penalty in the sentencing phase of the first trial. Such an
acquittal entitles the defendant to invoke the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against double jeopardy to preclude any further consideration of the death
penalty. Until recently, the law was clear that any jury-imposed life sentence
constituted an acquittal of death barring the prosecution from seeking death
on retrial following successful appeal of the underlying conviction.' Recent
developments attaching increased legal significance to sentencing factors
have called this rule into question, and it is no longer certain that all jury-
rendered life sentences will provide capital defendants with double-jeopardy
protection from the death penalty.2
In Ring v. Arizona,3 the Supreme Court declared that aggravating
circumstances that make the defendant eligible for the death penalty operate
as the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense because they
increase the maximum imposable punishment.4 Subsequently, in Sattazahn
5v. Pennsylvania, a plurality of the Court asserted that the holding in Ring
alters the definition of what constitutes an acquittal of death and suggested a
test that would drastically reduce double-jeopardy protection from
death on retrial.6 This Note analyzes the merits of the Sattazahn plurality's
1. See infra Part II.B (explaining the implied acquittal of death).
2. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (explaining that the recent declaration
that aggravating factors constitute elements of the crime of "capital murder plus one or more
aggravator(s)" narrows the situations in which a defendant will receive an acquittal of death).
3. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). For a discussion of the Ring case, see Part
IV.A.
4. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (explaining that aggravating factors operate as the
functional equivalent of a greater offense and thus must be found by the jury).
5. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003). For a discussion of the Sattazahn
case, see Part III.
6. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 110-13 (stating that because Ring established that "the
underlying offense of 'murder' is a distinct, lesser included offense of 'murder plus one or more
aggravating circumstances,'' a defendant will not receive an acquittal of death unless the jury
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assertions and ultimately concludes that although Ring does change the
necessary elements of an acquittal of death, the plurality's proposed test
narrows the situations in which a life sentence will provide double-jeopardy
protection beyond what the law requires. Nonetheless, this Note urges
capital defense attorneys to act now and request more specific verdict forms
in their clients' initial capital-sentencing proceedings. These detailed forms
will ensure that any information necessary to establish an acquittal of death
under any test that may evolve is preserved, and thus ensure that defendants
will not lose their rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause due to lack of
proof.
Part II of this Note provides background information on Double
Jeopardy jurisprudence and explains the previously established standard for
an acquittal of death that the Sattazahn plurality now challenges.7 Part III
analyzes the Sattazahn opinion and introduces the plurality's proposed test
of what constitutes an acquittal of death.8 Part IV explains the plurality's
justification for altering the prior understanding of what constitutes an
acquittal of death and fleshes out the requirements of the plurality's
proposed test.9 In Part V, the Note conducts a legal analysis of the
plurality's proposed test and anticipates the Supreme Court's likely course
with respect to the future of the standard for a death acquittal, ultimately
predicting that the plurality's test will not become controlling law but that
some change in the definition of an acquittal of death is imminent.'0
Finally, Part VI discusses the ramifications of the plurality's new test and
proposes a solution, forewarning capital defense attorneys to take
precautions so that they will be able to establish the facts necessary to
prove an acquittal of death no matter what course the Court ultimately
takes."
unanimously concludes that the prosecution has failed to prove the existence of aggravating
circumstances).
7. See infra Part II (explaining Double Jeopardy generally, the doctrine of implied
acquittal, and the development of the implied acquittal of death).
8. See infra Part III (analyzing the Sattazahn opinion).
9. See infra Part IV (exploring the plurality's proposed test).
10. See infra Part V (predicting the future of the plurality's proposed test).
11. See infra Part VI (discussing the ramifications of an adoption of the plurality's test).
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II. Background
The Double Jeopardy Clause, found in the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, declares that "no person shall ... be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. ',1 2 The goal of
this provision is to prevent the additional expense, embarrassment, and
anxiety of the defendant, as well as the heightened risk of erroneous
conviction that would result if the government could use its vast power and
resources in repeated attempts to convict a defendant of an alleged crime.
1 3
Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn in a jury trial and when the judge
hears the first piece of evidence regarding the issue of guilt or innocence in
a bench trial. 14 These events trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause, and when
jeopardy later terminates, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government
from further prosecuting the individual for the alleged offense. 15 The three
basic events that will terminate jeopardy are conviction, acquittal, and
discharge of the jury without the defendant's consent when such discharge
was not a manifest necessity.
16
Although it is well settled under the Fifth Amendment that an acquittal
terminates jeopardy and bars retrial, 17 the issue of what constitutes an
acquittal is a frequently litigated question. As Sattazahn illustrates, the
Court's decisions in this area constantly tweak and refine the definition of
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (noting that the
underlying idea of the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be allowed to use its
power and resources to repeatedly attempt to convict a defendant of an offence, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and anxiety and increasing the possibility that he be
found guilty despite his innocence). The Double Jeopardy Clause, originally a prohibition on
the federal government, applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
14. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) ("In the case of a jury trial,
jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn. In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches
when the court begins to hear evidence.") (citations omitted).
15. See Green, 355 U.S. at 188 (discussing the various events that will end a defendant's
jeopardy and bar subsequent retrial).
16. See id. (noting that a verdict of guilt or innocence will bar a second trial on the same
charge and also that discharge of the jury without the defendant's consent will bar retrial when a
completion of the first trial was not impossible); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,671 (1896)
(explaining that an acquittal is final and cannot be reviewed without putting the defendant twice
in jeopardy); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (stating that the trial
can be terminated over the defendant's objection without barring retrial when "there is a
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated" and
concluding that a hung jury constitutes such a situation).
17. Green, 355 U.S. at 188.
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acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy. Before exploring the
ramifications of the Sattazahn plurality's departure from prior death
penalty jurisprudence, this Note will discuss the foundation of the implied
acquittal and the subsequent development of the pre-Sattazahn
understanding of what constitutes an acquittal of death. 18
A. The Implied Acquittal
That an acquittal of an offense is final and bars retrial for that offense
even if it was based on an erroneous foundation is a deeply-rooted principle
in our criminal law,' 9 but equally well established is the principle that
double jeopardy does not bar retrial when a conviction is later set aside for
trial error.2° When the defendant successfully appeals a conviction of a
lesser included offense on grounds of trial error, it has not always been
clear which of these principles would determine the charges the
government could lawfully bring on retrial. As long as the conviction on
the lesser offense stood, it was universally accepted that the government
was barred from any further prosecution for the offense set forth in the
indictment. 2' However, a split developed among the states as to whether a
defendant's successful appeal of that conviction waived his double-
jeopardy protection with respect to the greater offense on which the jury
had refused to convict in addition to the lesser offense for which he was
convicted.22
18. See infra Part II.A-B (explaining the implied acquittal and discussing its application
in the capital-sentencing context).
19. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (holding that the verdict of
acquittal was final and could not be reviewed even though it was "based upon an egregiously
erroneous foundation"); Ball, 163 U.S. at 671 ("The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not
be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and
thereby violating the Constitution.").
20. See Ball, 163 U.S. at 672 ("[A] defendant, who procures ajudgment against him upon
an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another
indictment, for the same offence of which he had been convicted.").
21. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957) (discussing the well-established
idea that conviction on a lesser included offense provides the defendant with a valid defense of
former jeopardy for that offense and any greater offenses upon which the jury refused to
convict).
22. See id. at 216 n.4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (listing the nineteen states that permitted
retrial for the greater offense and the seventeen states that barred retrial for the greater offense).
1966
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The Supreme Court finally resolved this issue in Green v. United States23 by
holding that retrial for the greater offense violated double jeopardy.24 Although the
dissent argued that after a defendant calls the propriety of the proceeding into
question "a complete reexamination of the issues in-dispute is appropriate and not
unjust,, 25 the majority held that conviction of a lesser included offense constitutes
an implied acquittal of the greater offenses, which a defendant cannot waive by
appealing the conviction.26 The Court reasoned that it would be fundamentally
unfair to require a defendant to "barter his constitutional protection against a second
prosecution" for the greater offense "as the price of a successful appeal from an
erroneous conviction" on the lesser offense.27
B. Development of the Implied Acquittal in Capital-Sentencing Proceedings
Green established that conviction of a lesser included offense in a trial on the
merits constitutes an implied acquittal of any greater offense and bars retrial on that
greater offense, but the Supreme Court has been hesitant in extending these principles
to sentencing proceedings. 28 Stroud v. United States29 was the first major case to
23. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). In Green, the Supreme Court
considered whether a conviction of a lesser included offense by a jury authorized to find the
defendant guilty of a greater offense constituted an implied acquittal of the greater offense, thus
barring retrial for the greater offense after the conviction of the lesser offense was set aside upon
defendant's motion. Id. at 189-90. In Green's first trial, the jury was presented with charges of
first- and second-degree murder and found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder. Id. at
190. This conviction was reversed on the defendant's appeal and remanded for a new trial, in
which defendant was again tried for first-degree murder despite the first jury's refusal to convict
on that charge. Id. The new jury convicted Green of first-degree murder, and he appealed this
conviction all the way to the Supreme Court. Id. at 186. The Court held that retrial of first-
degree murder was a violation of the Fifth Amendment because "[clonditioning an appeal of one
offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a
forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy." Id. at 193-94.
24. Id. at 193-94.
25. Id. at 219 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 193-94, 198.
27. Id. at 193.
28. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,437-38 (1981) (noting that the Court has
resisted attempts to extend the principle that an acquittal bars retrial to sentencing proceedings);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,719-20, 723-24 (1969) (explaining that "the guarantee
against double jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon
reconviction").
29. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919). In Stroud, the Supreme Court
considered whether the defendant could be subjected to the death penalty on retrial even though
the previous jury found him "guilty as charged in the indictment without capital punishment."
Id. at 17. The Court noted that the indictment contained only one count, and the fact that the
jury mitigated punishment to life imprisonment "did not render the conviction less than one for
1967
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1961 (2004)
consider whether a life sentence serves as jeopardy protection against the death
penalty in a subsequent trial following reversal of the conviction. 30 The Stroud
Court held that the prior life sentence did not bar retrial for death, but in so
holding the Court relied on the fact that the sentencing procedure in that case
was part of the single trial on first-degree murder.31 The general rule remains
that imposition of a particular sentence is not deemed to be an acquittal of any
harsher sentence that could be imposed, 32 but in Bullington v. Missouri33 the
first degree murder." Id. at 17-18. Accordingly, the Court held that because the conviction and
sentence were reversed upon the defendant's appeal, the imposition of the death penalty did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 18.
30. In several cases the Supreme Court recognizes Stroud as one of the first major cases
dealing with this issue. See, e.g., Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439 (discussing Stroud as relevant
precedent).
31. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 18.
32. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134, 137 (1980) (noting that the
"Court's decisions in the sentencing area clearly establish that a sentence does not have the
qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal" and further explaining that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not require that a sentence be given a degree of finality that
prevents its later increase"); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723 ("[N]either the double jeopardy provision
nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon
reconviction.").
33. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). In Bullington, the Supreme Court
considered whether a life sentence rendered in a sentencing proceeding resembling a trial on
guilt or innocence constituted an acquittal of the death penalty, thus barring the government
from seeking the death penalty on retrial. Id. at 432. The jury in the first trial found Bullington
guilty of capital murder at the guilt/innocence phase, but returned a verdict fixing Bullington's
penalty at life without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty years at the sentencing phase.
Id. at 435-36. The defendant's conviction was later reversed on procedural error and remanded
for new trial, in which the government again sought the death penalty. Id. at 436. After the
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claims, the Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari to consider the issue. Id. at 437. The Court recognized
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not impose an absolute prohibition against the imposition
of a harsher sentence at retrial after the defendant successfully appeals his conviction. Id. at
438. Nonetheless, the Court held that because the sentencing phase in Bullington's first trial
resembled a trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the jury's life sentence constituted an
acquittal of death barring retrial on the issue of death. Id. at 446. The court explained that the
sentencing phase prescribed by the Missouri statutes was markedly different from the sentencing
phase in Stroud and other cases where double jeopardy was held inapplicable to sentencing. Id.
at 438. Specifically, the Court noted that Missouri's capital-sentencing statute contained
substantive standards to guide the discretion of the sentencer, based the jury's decision on
evidence introduced in a separate proceeding that formally resembled a trial, and required the
prosecution to establish certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain the death
penalty. Id. The Court concluded that in such a sentencing proceeding the jury must determine
whether the state proved its case, and thus imposition of a life sentence means that the jury has
acquitted the defendant of the factors necessary to impose death. Id. at 444-45.
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Supreme Court carved out an exception to this rule for capital-sentencing
proceedings that "have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence."
34
In Bullington, the jury in the first trial in state court found the defendant
guilty of first-degree murder in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and
sentenced him to life without possibility of probation or parole for fifty years
in the sentencing phase.35 The sentencing procedure in Bullington's first trial
was significantly different than the procedures "employed in any of the
Court's cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable
to sentencing" in that the jury's discretion was limited to two alternatives, the
decision was guided by substantive standards and based on evidence
introduced in a trial-like proceeding, and the prosecution was required to
prove the existence of certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury
could impose the death penalty. 36 The Bullington Court explained that this
bifurcated sentencing proceeding "was itself a trial on the issue of
punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes."37 Unlike the
sentencing proceeding employed in Stroud, this trial-like sentencing
proceeding made it possible to discern from the jury's imposition of a life
sentence that the prosecution failed to prove its case on the issue of death.38
Thus, the Court concluded that when the sentencing proceeding at a
defendant's first trial resembles a trial on guilt or innocence, "the protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is
available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. 39 This principle
announced in Bullington has had far-reaching implications because nearly all
modem capital-sentencing statutes require trial-like procedures in the sentencing
phase.40 These death penalty statutes require the jury to find the existence of
one or more aggravating factors (aggravators) before the defendant can
34. Id. at 439.
35. Id. at 435-36 (discussing the disposition of the defendant's first trial).
36. Id. at 438.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 444-45.
39. Id. at 446.
40. See id. at 432-33 (comparing the Missouri statute to "most death penalty legislation
enacted after this Court's decision in Furnan v. Georgia"). But see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) (emphasizing that "[t]o pass constitutional muster, a capital-sentencing
scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty"' and noting
that most states satisfy this narrowing function by requiring the jury to find the existence of at
least one aggravator at the sentencing phase, but holding that there is "no reason why this
narrowing function may not be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the
trial or the guilt phase" (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983))).
1969
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become eligible for the death penalty.4' If the jury finds the defendant death
eligible, the jury then considers whether the death penalty is appropriate by
weighing the aggravators against any mitigating circumstances (mitigators)
presented by the defendant and will impose death if the aggravators sufficiently
outweigh the mitigators.42
The Court further explained the principle announced in Bullington in the
case of Arizona v. Rumsey.43 In Rumsey, the trial judge sentenced the
defendant to life after deciding that the prosecution failed to prove the existence
of any of the aggravating factors that would render imposition of the death
penalty permissible under Arizona's capital-sentencing scheme.
44
Subsequently, on the State's cross-appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court decided
that the trial court erred in concluding that no aggravating factors existed, and
thus remanded the case for a resentencing proceeding in which defendant was
41. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2001) (declaring that "[t]he penalty of death
shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that" at
least one of the statutory aggravators existed).
42. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.") (citations omitted).
43. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 209 (1984) (articulating the Bullington
principles). In Rumsey, the Court considered whether double jeopardy prohibits the state from
sentencing a defendant to death after the life sentence initially returned by the jury in a trial-like
sentencing proceeding was set aside on appeal. Id. at 205. A jury convicted the defendant of
armed robbery and first-degree murder, and in a separate sentencing hearing prescribed by
Arizona statute, the trial judge returned a special verdict denying the presence of any
aggravating circumstances and accordingly sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Id. at 205-06. In making his findings on the
existence of the aggravating circumstances, the trial judge interpreted the "pecuniary gain"
aggravator to apply only to killings for hire rather than any murder committed to obtain money.
Id. at 206-07. In addition to the life sentence, the court sentenced the defendant to twenty-one
years imprisonment for the armed robbery and declared that the two sentences were to run
consecutively. Id. at 206. The defendant appealed the determination that the sentences should
run consecutively, which permitted the government to cross-appeal the trial judge's
determination that the pecuniary gain aggravator applied only to contract killings. Id. at 206-
07. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the defendant's challenge to his sentence but agreed
with the government that the trial court misinterpreted the pecuniary gain aggravator, and thus
set the life sentence aside and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 207. On remand, the trial court
found the existence of the pecuniary gain aggravator and sentenced the defendant to death. Id.
at 208. In setting that sentence aside, the Supreme Court explained that Bullington controlled
the disposition of the case and held that the trial judge's findings denying the existence of any
aggravating circumstances constituted an acquittal and created a legal entitlement to the life
sentence. Id. at 212.
44. Id. at 206.
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sentenced to death.45 The U.S. Supreme Court set the sentence aside, noting
that "the double jeopardy principle relevant to [Rumsey's] case is the same as
that invoked in Bullington: an acquittal on the merits by the sole decisionmaker
in the proceeding is final and bars retrial on the same charge., 46 The Court
explained that life sentences in such cases constitute an acquittal of death
because the trial court's judgment is based on the finding that the prosecution
failed to prove the facts necessary to impose death and is thus "sufficient to
establish legal entitlement to the life sentence. '4 7 The Rumsey Court further
noted that because a life sentence rendered in these trial-like sentencing
proceedings amounts to an acquittal on the merits, it will bar retrial even if
48based on legal error.
Importantly, the critical issue for purposes of double jeopardy identified
in the Bullington and Rumsey case line is not simply whether the defendant
received a life sentence at his first trial, but whether that first life sentence
''was an 'acquittal' based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement
to the life sentence.',49 For the life sentence to constitute an acquittal, the
factfinder in the sentencing proceeding must determine that the prosecution
failed to prove its case on the issue of death.50 The general rule is that "a
retrial following a 'hung jury' does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause"
because in that instance the declaration of a mistrial is a manifest necessity,
and retrial is necessary for resolution of the case.51 This hung-jury-permits-
retrial rule applies with equal force in capital-sentencing proceedings
52
despite the fact that nearly every state has statutory provisions imposing a life
sentence in the event of a hung jury in a capital-sentencing proceeding, which
45. Id. at 207-08.
46. Id. at 211.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (holding that an
acquittal bars retrial even if it was based on an "egregiously erroneous foundation").
49. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 108 (2003) (setting forth the relevant
inquiry for purposes of double jeopardy in the capital-sentencing context).
50. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,444-45 (1981) (explaining that because the
trial-like sentencing proceeding "explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the
prosecution has 'proved its case"' the jury's decision that the defendant does not deserve the
penalty of death constitutes an acquittal of death).
51. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109 (quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324
(1984)).
52. See id. (noting that no double-jeopardy protection exists when the jury deadlocks and
denying the defendant's argument that the uniqueness of capital-sentencing proceedings justifies
affording the defendant double-jeopardy protection when a life sentence is imposed after ajury
deadlock) (quoting Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324).
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arguably solves the problem of resolution.53 The theory is that when the jury is
deadlocked, it has neither convicted nor acquitted the defendant of the death
penalty. In such a situation the Court has explained that double jeopardy does
not bar retrial because of "society's interest in giving the prosecution one
complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. ,54 As long as
the jury unanimously sentenced the defendant to life, however, Bullington and
its progeny would consider the verdict to be a jeopardy-terminating event
whether it was the result of a unanimous finding that the aggravators were not
proven, a majority finding that the aggravators were not proven, or a finding
that, despite existence of aggravators, death was not proper due to factors in
mitigation. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania casts doubt on this understanding,
however, because in Part ImI of the opinion, a plurality of the Justices call for a
much narrower definition of what constitutes an acquittal of death .55
III. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania
A. Facts
On the evening of April 12, 1987, David Allen Sattazahn and his
accomplice hid in a wooded area with guns in hand waiting to rob the manager
56of Heidelberg Family Restaurant, Richard Boyer. At closing time, the two
men accosted Boyer in the restaurant's parking lot, drew their guns, and
demanded the deposit bag holding the restaurant's receipts from that day.57
Boyer threw the bag of money toward the roof of the restaurant and began to
run away, ignoring Sattazahn's order to retrieve the bag. 58 Both Sattazahn and
53. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(c)(1)(v) (2003) ("[T]he court may, in its
discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a
unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(E) (2001) ("In the event the jury cannot
agree as to the penalty, the court shall dismiss the jury, and impose a sentence of imprisonment
for life.").
54. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1977) (stating that a hung jury is the
"classic basis for a proper mistrial" and explaining that the rule allowing a "trial judge [to]
discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial...
accords recognition to society's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to
convict those who have violated its laws").
55. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality's new
definition of what constitutes an acquittal of death and its possible effects on capital
defendants).
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his accomplice fired shots at Boyer, and when Boyer fell dead, the two men
grabbed the deposit bag and fled the scene.
59
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania prosecuted Sattazahn, and on May
10, 1991, a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and other charges.60
During the sentencing phase, the prosecution sought the death penalty and
presented evidence on the statutory aggravating circumstance of "commission
of the murder while in the perpetration of a felony." 61 The defense presented
Sattazahn's lack of a significant history of prior convictions and his age at the
time of the crime as mitigating circumstances.62
Under Pennsylvania law, the jury must return a death sentence if it
unanimously finds the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances and
no mitigating circumstances, or if it unanimously finds the existence of one or
more aggravating circumstances that outweigh any established mitigating
circumstances. 63 In all other cases the verdict must be a life sentence, and the
relevant statute further provides that the court may discharge the jury and
impose a life sentence if it appears the jury will be unable to reach a unanimous
agreement on the appropriate sentence.64 Sattazahn's jury was deadlocked nine
to three in favor of life, and upon the defendant's motion the trial judge
discharged the jury as hung and entered the default life sentence provided by
the Pennsylvania statute.
65
Sattazahn appealed his conviction, challenging, among other things, the
trial judge's jury instruction that stated that a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that Sattazahn was armed with an unlicensed firearm "shall be evidence
of his intention to commit" crimes of violence such as first-degree murder.
66
The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the trial judge's instruction was a
conclusive presumption that effectively relieved the prosecution of its burden to
prove Sattazahn acted with the intent to commit murder and other crimes of
67violence. Accordingly, the court reversed Sattazahn's conviction and
remanded for new trial.68
59. Id.
60. Id.




65. Id. at 104-05.
66. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 603-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
67. Id. at 606.
68. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
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On remand, the prosecution again sought the death penalty and this time
alleged two aggravating circumstances. 69  Sattazahn objected to the
prosecution's attempt to seek death and to introduce the new aggravating
circumstances, but the trial court and the state appellate court both denied the
motion. 70 The jury in the second trial convicted Sattazahn of first-degree
murder and sentenced him to death in the penalty phase.71 On direct appeal the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the guilty verdict and the death sentence,
concluding that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Due Process Clause
72barred the Commonwealth from seeking death on retrial. The United StatesSupreme Court granted certiorari.73
B. Opinion of the Supreme Court
Before the Court, the defendant argued that (1) although retrial following a
hung jury does not normally violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the statutory life
sentence imposed by the court following the hung jury in the penalty phase
triggered double-jeopardy protections, 4 and (2) the death sentence unfairly
deprived him of the life and liberty interest created by the Pennsylvania statute
mandating imposition of a life sentence after a hung jury, and thus deprived him
of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 The four-Justice
dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the defendant's contention that
the court-imposed life sentence following the hung jury provided double-jeopardy
protection.76 The dissent reasoned that although the entry of the life sentence by the
trial court did not constitute an acquittal, it nonetheless terminated jeopardy because
it was a trial-terminating judgment for life not prompted by a procedural move on
the part of the defendant.77 In making this decision, the dissent emphasized: (1) the






74. Id. at 109.
75. Id. at 115.
76. See id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[O]nce the trial court entered a final
judgement of life for Sattazahn, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking
the death penalty a second time.").
77. Id. at 123-24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the final judgment entered by
the Pennsylvania trial court triggered the defendant's interest in avoiding renewed prosecution).
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not terminate jeopardy and (2) the unique severity and finality of the death
penalty.
78
The majority of the Court held that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment barred the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty against
Sattazahn on retrial.79 With respect to Sattazahn's due process argument, the
majority concluded that nothing in the Pennsylvania statute indicates that the
"life" or "liberty" interest in the life sentence was immutable and that Sattazahn
deprived himself of any such interest when he sought to invalidate the
underlying conviction. 0
In response to Sattazahn's double-jeopardy argument, the majority
explained that the critical inquiry for determining whether jeopardy has
terminated in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has been an
acquittal. 8  The majority concluded that neither the jury deadlock nor the
court's entry of a life sentence constituted an acquittal because neither involved
findings resolving any factual matter that would establish legal entitlement to
the life sentence.82 Thus, the majority went on to hold that double jeopardy did
not bar the prosecution from seeking death on retrial, rejecting the dissent's
contention that the statutorily imposed life sentence provided double-jeopardy
protection to the defendant despite its nonacquittal status.83
The Court could have reached its holding in Sattazahn by simply
applying previously established double-jeopardy principles because the jury
was hung on the issue of death and thus did not acquit the defendant under the
Bullington test. 84 Rather than relying on Bullington's definition of an acquittal
78. Id. at 126-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that under the majority's decision
a defendant who was sentenced to life after a jury deadlock must "relinquish either her right to
file a potentially meritorious appeal, or her state-granted entitlement to avoid thedeath penalty"
and further emphasizing the unique severity and finality of the death penalty).
79. Id. at 116.
80. Id. at 115-16.
81. Id. at 109 ("[Tlhe touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing
proceedings is whether there has been an 'acquittal."').
82. Id. at 109-10 (explaining that a deadlocked jury is a nonresult and thus not based on
findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to life and that the court-imposed life sentence
is similarly not based on findings sufficient to constitute an acquittal because the trial judge has
no discretion in prescribing the sentence after mistrial is entered).
83. See id. at 113-15 (discussing the various problems with the dissent's reasoning and
ultimately rejecting the dissent's conclusion that the statutorily imposed life sentence provides
jeopardy protection).
84. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (explaining that a life sentence after a
hung jury does not constitute an acquittal under Bullington).
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of death, however, three members of the Court-Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas-outlined a different rationale for
concluding that Sattazahn's life sentence did not provide double-jeopardy
85protection. As explained above, the Supreme Court's opinions dealing with
double jeopardy in the death penalty context prior to Sattazahn were thought to
stand for the proposition that a hung jury on the issue of death would not
protect the defendant from death on retrial, but any unanimous decision by the
jury to impose life constituted an acquittal based on findings sufficient to create
a legal entitlement to the life sentence. 86 The Sattazahn plurality's rationale for
its holding called into question this understanding of what constitutes an
acquittal of death when it explained that Sattazahn could face the death penalty
in his second trial not merely because the jury failed to come to a unanimous
decision for life, but because it failed to reach a unanimous decision that the
prosecution did not prove the existence of the aggravating factors. 8 7 This Note
contends that this plurality opinion offers a much narrower test for what
constitutes an acquittal of death and, if adopted by a majority of the Court, will
necessitate a major change in capital murder verdict forms.
IV. The Sattazahn Plurality's New Definition of the Implied
Acquittal of Death
A. Rationale for a Narrower Definition of the Implied Acquittal of Death-
the Impact of Apprendi and Ring
The new theory of what constitutes an acquittal of death introduced in the
Sattazahn plurality was inspired by two recent criminal cases "clarif[ying] what
constitutes an 'element' of an offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's
jury-trial guarantee." 88 These decisions involved the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, but they annunciate a principle applicable in other areas of the law,
such as the double jeopardy issue discussed in Sattazahn. In Apprendi v.
New Jersey,89 the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of
85. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-14 (2003).
86. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (explaining that although a life
sentence after a hung jury does not constitute an acquittal under Bullington, a unanimous
decision by the jury to impose life does).
87. See infra Part IV (explaining the plurality's test).
88. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111.
89. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Apprendi Court considered
whether the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
1976
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a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum" constitutes an element of the offense that the
prosecution must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.90
Subsequently, in Ring v. Arizona,9 1 the Court explained that the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right "would be senselessly diminished if it
encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by
two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death." 92 Thus, the
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that all factual
findings increasing the defendant's sentence beyond that statutorily prescribed maximum be
submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 469. The defendant in
Apprendi fired several shots into the home of an African-American family that had recently
moved into his all-white neighborhood, and subsequently pleaded guilty to two second-degree
offenses and one third-degree offense for the aforementioned shooting and shootings on three
other occasions. Id. at 469-70. As part of the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to
seek an enhanced sentence pursuant to New Jersey law on the ground that the offense involving
the African-American family was motivated by racial bias. Id. at 470. The trial judge found by
a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi's actions were the result of racial bias and thus
rendered a sentence higher than the statutory maximum on the relevant count. Id. at 471. The
defendant appealed, arguing that the Constitution requires the finding of racial bias underlying
his sentencing enhancement be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 471. The
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld the enhanced sentence and a
divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the hate crime provision did not allow
impermissible burden shifting and thus did not constitute an element of a separate offense. Id.
at 472-73. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that "other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. The
Court explained that a long history of common-law rulings linking "verdict and judgment and
the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal penalties
provided" served as the foundation for its decision. Id. at 482.
90. Id. at 490.
91. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Court determined that the
Apprendi decision's holding that any factor increasing the defendant's punishment beyond the
statutory maximum must be proven to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt applies with equal force
in the capital-sentencing process. Id. at 588-89. A jury found the defendant guilty of first-
degree murder for his involvement in an armed robbery resulting in the death of an armored van
driver, but under Arizona law, he could not receive a death sentence unless the trial judge made
further findings. Id. at 591-92. Pursuant to the Arizona sentencing scheme, a trial judge
sentenced Ring to death after concluding in a separate sentencing hearing that the prosecution
had proven the existence of the requisite aggravating factors and that the existing mitigator did
not warrant leniency. Id. at 594-95. Ring appealed, contending that underApprendi, Arizona's
capital-sentencing scheme violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution because it entrusts ajudge to find the existence of factors that raise the defendant's
maximum penalty. Id. at 595. The Court found that the judge's finding of an aggravating
circumstance exposed the defendant to a harsher sentence than that authorized by the jury
verdict, rejected Arizona's argument that capital cases should be treated differently with regard
to the Sixth Amendment protection defined in Apprendi, and thus held the scheme
unconstitutional under Apprendi. Id. at 604, 607, 609.
92. Id. at 609.
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Court extended the principle announced in Apprendi to the capital-sentencing
context.93 Though these cases dealt only with the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right, declaring that aggravating factors constitute "elements" has significant
implications in the double-jeopardy context.
Prior to these decisions, aggravating factors making the defendant death
eligible were considered to be mere sentencing factors, and it was believed that
the sentencing proceeding simply imposed a sentence for the capital crime
previously found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.94 Therefore, prior
double jeopardy cases in the capital-sentencing context could only justify the
extension of double-jeopardy protection to capital-sentencing proceedings on
the rationale that the proceedings were analogous to a trial on guilt or
innocence.95 In light of Ring's ruling that aggravating factors are in effect
elements of a greater crime, however, it becomes clear that the capital-
sentencing proceeding does not merely resemble a trial on guilt or innocence; it
is an actual trial of the defendant's guilt or innocence for the offense of "murder
plus one or more aggravating circumstances."9 6 This revelation legitimizes the
Court's application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to capital-sentencing
proceedings,97 which the Court previously stumbled over because the Clause
guarantees only that no one shall be "subjectfor the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."98 According to the Sattazahn plurality, this
revelation also illuminates two conditions that a jury-rendered life sentence
must satisfy in order to constitute an acquittal: (1) that the jury finds the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of aggravating factors and (2) that
such finding be unanimous.
99
93. Id.
94. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110 (2003) (explaining that prior to
Apprendi and Ring, capital-sentencing proceedings "dealt only with the sentence to be imposed
for the 'offence' of capital murder" and thus "differed from trials in a respect crucial for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause").
95. See id. at 110-11 ("[I]n search for a rationale to support Bullington and its 'progeny,'
the Court continually tripped over the text of the Double Jeopardy clause.").
96. See id. (stating that Ring held, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial
guarantee, that murder is a lesser included offense of murder plus one or more aggravators and
no justifiable reason exists to distinguish between what constitutes an offense for the jury-trial
guarantee versus the double-jeopardy protection).
97. See id. at 110-11 (noting that prior to Ring the Court "continually tripped over the
text of the Double Jeopardy Clause" because the capital-sentencing proceedings were thought to
only involve the sentence to be imposed and later explaining that Ring "illuminated" the
justification for application of jeopardy protection to capital sentencing).
98. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
99. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112. The plurality stated that:
In the post-Ring world, the Double Jeopardy Clause can, and must, apply to some
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B. The First Requirement of the Plurality's Test for an Implied Acquittal of
Death-Jury Rejection of the Aggravators
With the newfound understanding that a capital-sentencing proceeding is
actually a trial on the merits for the crime of murder plus one or more
aggravators, Justice Scalia concluded that the only way a defendant can be
acquitted of that crime is if the jury finds that the prosecution failed to prove
the elements required for conviction."'° Failure of proof on any essential
element constitutes an acquittal of an offense in guilt/innocence proceedings,'
0 1
and applying this concept with equal force in the capital context serves to
maintain consistency in the application of double-jeopardy protection for all
offenses. Justice Scalia asserted that requiring jury rejection of aggravators for
an acquittal is analytically necessary in light of the Ring decision, presumably
under the assumption that it would be contradictory to classify ajury verdict in
which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the elements of the
crime were satisfied as an acquittal.1
0 2
Because the jury's conclusion on the existence of aggravators does not
dictate the verdict in a capital-sentencing proceeding, a jury-rendered life
sentence does not necessarily mean that the jury found that the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of the crime of murder plus one or more
aggravators. Unlike traditional guilt/innocence trials where jurors must vote for
a conviction if they conclude that the prosecution has proven all elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt (and the defendant did not establish an
affirmative defense), 0 3 jurors in capital-sentencing proceedings are not
capital-sentencing proceedings .... If a jury unanimously concludes that a State
has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more aggravating
circumstances, double-jeopardy protections attach to that "acquittal' on the offense
of "murder plus aggravating circumstance(s)."
Id.
100. See id. (concluding that because "'murder plus one or more aggravating
circumstances' is a separate offense from 'murder simpliciter,"' one must determine whether the
factfinder has made findings that constitute an acquittal of the offense of murder plus one or
more aggravators).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)
(explaining that in order to determine whether a factfinder's action in a trial on the issue of guilt
or innocence constitutes an acquittal, one must determine whether the factfinder's conclusion in
favor of the defendant "represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged").
102. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text (explaining that this assumption
overlooks situations in which the jury finds the existence of all the elements of a crime but
acquits the defendant because of an affirmative defense such as self-defense).
103. See, e.g., VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction No. G33.200(A)
(2003) ("If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable
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obligated to vote for death even if they find the prosecution has proved the
existence of one or more aggravators.' 4 The finding of aggravators by ajury
simply makes the defendant death eligible; jurors may consider any
mitigating factors and have discretion to set the punishment at life despite an
affirmative finding as to the existence of aggravating circumstances. 105 If the
jury does find the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt
but nonetheless sets the punishment at life, the defendant would clearly not be
"acquitted" under the plurality's test and could thus face retrial on the issue of death
following successful appeal of his conviction. 1°6 This life verdict would not
constitute an acquittal because under Justice Scalia's test only a finding that the
prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime establishes legal entitlement to
the life sentence. Because many life verdicts are based on a determination that the
proven aggravators are insufficient or that the mitigating circumstances outweigh
the aggravators rather than a finding that the prosecution failed to prove
doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you shall find the defendant
guilty .... ) (emphasis added).
104. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 971 1(c)(1)(iv) (2004) (stating that "the verdict must be a
sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance... and no
mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances
which outweigh any mitigating circumstances"); VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal
Instruction No. P33.122 (2003) ("If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt both of these [aggravating] circumstances, then you may fix
the punishment of the defendant at death.") (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania jury
instruction gives the jury less discretion than Virginia but still permits life sentences in
situations where all aggravators are proven.
105. This discretion given to juries varies among jurisdictions. In Virginia, the jury is
presumably free to set the punishment at life even if it finds the prosecution proved the
aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt and finds no mitigating circumstances. See VA. MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction No. P33.122 (2003) (explaining that even if the jury
finds that the prosecution has proved the aggravators, "if [the jury] nevertheless believe[s] from
all the evidence, including evidence in mitigation, that the death penalty is not justified, then
[the jury] shall fix the punishment of the defendant" at life). In contrast, Pennsylvania allows
for a life sentence in situations where the jury finds the prosecution proved the existence of
aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, but only if the jury found mitigating factors and the
aggravators do not outweigh those mitigating factors. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 971 l(c)(1)(iv)
(2004); see also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 303, 305-08 (1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute requiring the jury to sentence the defendant to death
if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances and stating that
the statute was not impermissibly mandatory because it did not automatically impose a sentence
of death upon conviction and allowed the jury to consider and give effect to all relevant
mitigating evidence).
106. See Priya Nath, Case Note, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 15 WASH. & LEE CAP. DEF. J.
419, 425 (2003) (introducing the notion that a jury life sentence in which the jury was
unanimous in finding an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt would not constitute an
acquittal under the plurality's test, and, thus, Justice Scalia would permit retrial on the issue of
death).
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the aggravators altogether, the plurality's new test of what constitutes an acquittal
effectively excludes a large portion of jury verdicts that were considered acquittals
under the Bullington case line.
C. The Second Requirement of the Plurality's Test for an Implied Acquittal of
Death-Jury Unanimity in Rejection of the Aggravators
Not only did the Sattazahn plurality require ajury finding that the aggravating
factors were not established for a life sentence to constitute an acquittal of death,
Justice Scalia, along with Chief Justice Rehquist and Justice Thomas, also asserted
that this finding must be unanimous. 107 An analysis of jury instructions and verdict
forms from various jurisdictions reveals that although unanimity is required in order
for a positive finding that the aggravators were established, it is not required for a
negative finding that aggravators were not established. 0 8 Because unanimity is not
necessary for the jury to enter a finding that it rejects the existence of aggravators,
the resulting life verdict could be the result of either a unanimous or a split jury on
the issue of aggravators. 1°9 In a case where only a majority of jurors rejected the
aggravators, the plurality would conclude that the jury was "hung" on the existence
of aggravators; thus, the finding was not an acquittal of death.110 Therefore, this
requirement further limits the situations previously believed to constitute an
acquittal of death by excluding those life sentences resulting from a non-unanimous
rejection of the aggravators.
Beyond reducing the situations in which the jury will acquit the defendant of
death, the unanimity requirement forces capital defense attorneys either to revamp
the current verdict forms or risk losing the implied acquittal of death altogether. In a
case in which the jury failed to find the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt and thus returned a life verdict, the verdict form will not disclose
whether the jury was unanimous in denying the aggravators or whether it
split on that issue."' Therefore, this ambiguity in current verdict forms
107. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112 (2003) ("If a jury unanimously
concludes that a State has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more
aggravating circumstances, double-jeopardy protections attach to that 'acquittal' on the offense
of 'murder plus aggravating circumstance(s)."') (emphasis added).
108. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the current inadequacy of the verdict forms).
109. See Nath, supra note 106, at 424 (explaining that verdict forms do not reveal whether
the jury was unanimous in rejecting an aggravating factor or split on that question).
110. See id. (explaining that if the jury is split on the existence of aggravators, it is hung on
that issue, and the plurality would not consider the defendant acquitted of the death penalty).
111. See id. (noting that the verdict form will not disclose whether the jury was unanimous
or split in rejecting the aggravating circumstances).
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effectively eliminates the implied acquittal of death under the plurality's test because
a capital defendant will be unable to establish the requisite unanimity and thus
unable to establish his legal entitlement to the prior life sentence." 2
V. The Future of the Plurality's New Test of What Constitutes
an Implied Acquittal of Death
A. Legal Analysis of the New Test
1. Analysis of the First Requirement-Jury Rejection of the Aggravators
The Sattazahn plurality suggests that because the Ring Court declared that the
existence of one or more aggravating factors constitutes an element of an offense, a
life verdict in which the jury unanimously finds the existence of one or more
aggravators can no longer be understood to confer upon the defendant legal
entitlement to that life sentence." 3 Although the plurality's contention that there
cannot be an acquittal of an offense if all the elements of that offense have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt is true in many cases, the plurality overlooks
situations in which the prosecution has proven all elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, but the defendant produces an affirmative defense either
justifying or excusing his actions. 14 The Sattazahn plurality thus failed to consider
that a defendant's proof of mitigators could serve as an affirmative defense
acquitting him of death despite the fact that the prosecution proved the existence of
one or more aggravators.
Justification and excuse defenses eliminate or reduce the punishment for the
offense even though a defendant is otherwise fully accountable. A justification,
such as self-defense, negates criminal liability for conduct which would otherwise
be criminal because such conduct is socially acceptable under the special
justifying circumstances. ! 5 An excuse, such as insanity or duress, also negates
112. See id. ("Because the verdict form will not reveal whether the jury unanimously
rejected the aggravator (an 'acquittal') or whether it was split on the existence of the aggravator
(a 'hung jury'), the defendant will not be able to establish his 'acquittal' of the aggravating
factor and, therefore, cannot establish his 'legal entitlement to a life sentence."').
113. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality opinion).
114. If the defendant relies on a defense that negates an element of the crime charged rather
than an excuse or justification defense, he cannot be acquitted of the crime unless the jury
rejects one or more of its elements.
115. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMiNAL LAW § 9. 1(a)(3), at 447 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining
that under special justifying circumstances, one will be relieved of criminal liability for
otherwise criminal conduct).
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criminal liability for actions that would otherwise constitute an offense, but
does so because the defendant lacks responsibility given the unique circumstances,
and thus punishment is inappropriate. 1 6 Both justification and excuse defenses
provide a basis for an acquittal despite the fact that all the elements of the offense
are fully established. 1 7 Similar to justification and excuse defenses that result in a
complete acquittal, circumstances that qualify as reasonable provocation and invoke
a state of passion within the defendant serve as a partial defense, acquitting the
defendant of murder and reducing his conviction to involuntary manslaughter even
though all the necessary elements of murder are fully established." 8
These defenses show that there are situations in which a jury can find all
elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and still acquit the defendant
on the grounds that extenuating circumstances exist that either justify the
behavior or excuse unacceptable behavior fully or partially. Presumably
because of the speed with which the law has been developing with regard to
status of aggravators as elements,119 the Sattazahn plurality overlooked this
means of acquittal when it analyzed the effect of Ring in the double-jeopardy
context and summarily stated that the jury must reject the aggravating
circumstances to acquit the defendant of death.' 20 Arguably, however, a
finding that mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factor(s) is
116. See id. § 9. l(a)(4), at 448 ("Excuses are in some respects like justifications .... The
principle distinction, however, is that in the case of an excuse conviction is deemed
inappropriate because of a lack of responsibility on the part of the defendant.").
117. See id. (explaining that both justification and excuse defenses "provide a basis for
acquittal"). But see MARKuS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE § 7, at 190
(2002) (explaining that the Model Penal Code actually treats the absence of justifications and
excuses as material elements of every crime).
118. See LAFAVE, supra note 115, § 9.1(b)(2), at 454 (describing how certain
circumstances may reduce a murder conviction to one of involuntary manslaughter). LaFave
explains:
A killing is murder if done (1) with intent to kill, (2) with intent to do serious
bodily harm, (3) with a depraved heart .... or (4) in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, subject to the qualification that an intentional homicide is
only manslaughter if the killing occurred in a heat of passion.
Id.
119. Apprendi declared that any fact other than prior conviction increasing the penalty
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum operates as the functional equivalent of an element of
a greater offense in 2000. This principle was not extended to the capital-sentencing context
until the Court decided Ring in June of 2002, and Sattazahn was decided only seven months
later on January 14, 2003.
120. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112 (2003) (stating that if the jury
unanimously concludes the prosecution failed to prove any aggravators, that conclusion would
operate as an acquittal of death and would thus bar the state from retrying the defendant for his
life).
1983
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1961 (2004)
analogous to the excuse and partial-excuse defenses and should thus entitle the
defendant to an acquittal of death. Just as the excuse defenses eliminate or
lessen punishment when certain circumstances deemed by society to negate or
reduce the defendant's responsibility are present and thus render the otherwise
applicable punishment inappropriate, mitigating circumstances require the jury
to impose a life sentence when it finds that the situations introduced by the
defendant negate or outweigh the aggravating factor(s) and consequently render
the death penalty inappropriate.1 21 Therefore, there is a strong argument that
requiring a jury rejection of the aggravators in order for a defendant's jury-
rendered life verdict to constitute an acquittal unjustifiably circumscribes the
situations in which defendants will receive double-jeopardy protection.
A comparison between the insanity defense and the use of mitigators for
capital defendants within the federal criminal scheme illustrates the similarities
between excuse defenses in trials on the merits and the use of mitigators in
capital-sentencing proceedings. Moreover, such a comparison provides a solid
justification for rejecting the Sattazahn plurality's contention that an acquittal
of death does not exist unless the jury rejects the existence of aggravators. The
insanity defense 122 excuses an otherwise guilty defendant because it provides a
defense even though all elements of the offense have been established. 123 In
comparison, the presence of mitigating factors that outweigh the aggravating
factor(s) requires the jury to sentence a death-eligible defendant to life despite
the fact that the elements of murder plus one or more aggravating factors have
been established. 124 Furthermore, in both instances, the burdens of production
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000) (stating that to justify a sentence of death, the
aggravating factors must sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factors found to exist).
122. See 18 U.S.C § 17 (2000) (outlining insanity as an affirmative defense and stating the
burden of proof).
123. See United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (discussing
the insanity defense). The court notes that the federal insanity defense:
[R]epresents an attempt by Congress to define the circumstances in which an
otherwise culpable defendant will be excused for his or her conduct because of
mental disease or defect, and that the section has no effect on the admissibility of
evidence offered by a defendant to negate the existence of specific intent and
thereby show his or her innocence.
Id.
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2000) (explainingthatbeforethejurycanconsiderthedeath
penalty, it must unanimously find the existence of one or more aggravators and stating that in
order for ajury to sentence the defendant to life, the aggravators must sufficiently outweigh the
mitigating factors, or, in the absence of mitigating factors, the aggravating factor(s) alone must
be sufficient to justify the death penalty). From this statutory language, it can be inferred that a
jury finding that the factors in mitigation outweigh the aggravators provides the defendant with
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and proof as to the existence of the exculpating circumstances are on the
defendant. 125 Although this analogy between the insanity defense and the use
of mitigators in capital-sentencing proceedings is not seamless,"26 it exposes a
flaw in the Sattazahn plurality's explanation for its conclusion that the jury
must reject the aggravators to produce an acquittal. Namely, the plurality failed
to address the possibility that proving mitigators that outweigh the aggravator(s)
could constitute an affirmative defense serving to acquit the defendant of the
death penalty despite the affirmative finding as to the existence of aggravators.
Allowing an acquittal in these circumstances would minimize the departure
from the pre-Ring understanding that a jury-rendered life sentence provides
double-jeopardy protection from death and attach meaningful significance to a
jury's unanimous determination that the death penalty is inappropriate under
the circumstances.
127
Some life sentences returned after the jury finds the existence of
aggravators, however, will not constitute an acquittal in light of Ring even if the
Court recognizes mitigators as an affirmative defense. This outcome will result
because many jurisdictions allow the jury to sentence the defendant to life even
if the jury does not find the existence of any mitigating factors. 128  In
a defense to the death penalty.
125. See id. § 17(b) ("The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by
clear and convincing evidence."); id. § 3593(c) ("The burden of establishing the existence of
any mitigating factor is on the defendant, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a
factor is established by a preponderance of the information.").
126. To establish an insanity defense, the defendant must prove to the jury that he passes a
very specific test proving his free will was impaired. See LAFAVE, supra note 115, §§ 7.2-7.5
(setting forth the various insanity tests). In contrast, the defendant can introduce any aspect of
his character or record and any circumstance of the offense to justify a sentence less than death.
See Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (explaining that "the sentencing process must
permit consideration of the 'character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death"' (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S 280, 304
(1976))).
127. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (setting forth the test for an acquittal of
death developed before the Ring decision).
128. E.g., IND. PATrERN JURY INsTRUCTIONS, Criminal, 15.13 (3d ed. 2003). The Indiana
instructions state that:
Even if you unanimously find that the State has met its burden of proof as to both
the existence of at least one charged aggravating circumstance and as to the
aggravating circumstance(s) outweighing the mitigating circumstance(s), the law
allows you to recommend that the Judge impose a term of years instead of the
sentence of [death] ....
Id. Federal law contains a similar provision. It states that in determining whether a sentence of
death is justified, the jury should:
[C]onsider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently
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a situation where the jury finds the existence of one or more aggravators (the
elements) and no mitigators (the affirmative defense) yet nonetheless returns a
life verdict, the Sattazahn plurality's conclusion that this life sentence would
not be an acquittal is analytically sound. Absent an affirmative defense, a
finding that all elements of an offense are established will not constitute an
acquittal because in such a case all factual issues relating to guilt or innocence
are resolved in favor of the prosecution. 129 Thus, regardless of whether the
Court recognizes proof of mitigators as an affirmative defense, recognition of
the Ring decision's classification of aggravators as elements in the double-
jeopardy context will serve to narrow the situations previously deemed to be an
acquittal under Bullington. The quantity of life sentences that will no longer
constitute an acquittal will be much greater, however, if the Court rejects the
argument that proof of mitigators is the functional equivalent of an affirmative
defense because then none of the life sentences returned after the jury finds the
existence of aggravators will qualify as an acquittal.
To rebut the contention that an acquittal cannot exist when one or more
aggravators are established and there is not an affirmative defense excusing
culpability, defense attorneys may argue that acknowledging the implications of
Ring in the double-jeopardy context would lead to other changes in criminal
procedure drastically altering capital murder jurisprudence. Thus, these
outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of
death, or in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or
factors alone are sufficient to justify a death sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2000) (emphasis added). This statute indicates that a jury in the federal
system could return a life sentence after finding aggravators and no mitigators on the grounds
that it believes the aggravators alone are insufficient. See also VA. MODEL JURY INrsMUC'nONS,
Criminal Instruction No. P33.122 (2003) (stating to the jury that "[ilf you find from the
evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt both of these
[aggravating] circumstances, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death" and
further explaining that, even if the jury finds that the prosecution has proved the aggravators, "if
[they] nevertheless believe from all the evidence.., that the death penalty is not justified, then
[the jury] shall fix the punishment of the defendant" at life) (emphasis added). But see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 971 l(c)(1)(iv) (2004) (stating that "the verdict must be a sentence of death
if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance... and no mitigating
circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which
outweigh any mitigating circumstances") (emphasis added).
129. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,571 (1977) (explaining
that what constitutes an acquittal will be determined by examining "whether the ruling of the
judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the
factual elements of the offense charged"); United States ex rel. Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook
County, 8 F. Supp. 2d 763,768-69 (N.D. Ill.) (explaining the definition of acquittal pronounced
in Martin Linen by stating that the definition focuses on factual issues relating to guilt or
innocence and noting that the affirmative defense of insanity does relate to guilt or innocence),
rev'd, 162 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1998).
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defense attorneys will urge that the classification of aggravators as elements
should be limited to the Sixth Amendment context in which it was pronounced,
and all life sentences should continue to constitute an acquittal of death under
Bullington. This slippery slope argument contends that if the Court applies
Ring's classification of aggravators as elements outside the context of the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee to disadvantage the defendant in the area of
double-jeopardy, defendants will argue that the classification similarly extends
to other areas that would advantage the defendant.1 30 For example, capital
defendants will argue that in jurisdictions in which defendants have a right to
an indictment by a grand jury, prosecutors must set forth the aggravators in the
indictment in order for a sentence of death to stand.' 3' If Ring's treatment of
aggravators as elements applies in the context of defendants' entitlement to
grand jury indictments, this argument will prevail because an indictment must
list all of the essential elements of the crime charged.
32
Similarly, defendants will demand that because the aggravators are
elements of the crime of capital murder plus one or more aggravators, the
prohibition on hearsay and other rules of evidence must apply to evidence
proffered by the prosecution to prove the existence of aggravators1 33 This rule
130. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) ("We can think of no
principled reason to distinguish, in this context, between what constitutes an offense for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee and what constitutes an 'offence' for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.").
131. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "no person shall be
held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment
of a grand jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not incorporate the right to indictment by a grand jury, but many states have
similar constitutional or statutory provisions conveying the right to criminal defendants. See
Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) ("[Tlhe 'due process of law' clause does not
require the State to adopt the institution and procedure of a grand jury.").
132. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (explaining the requirement
that an indictment list each element of a charged crime). The Court stated:
Our prior cases indicate than an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the
elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against
which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction
in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.
Id. (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CRM. P. 7 (stating that the indictment must contain "a
plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged").
133. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1976) (holding that the separate
proceeding brought under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act after conviction of specified sex
offenses constituted the making of a new charge and thus the defendant was entitled under the
Due Process Clause to certain procedural safeguards such as representation by counsel,
opportunity to be heard, to be confronted with witnesses against him, to cross-examine, and to
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would require many states to abandon the practice of applying looser
evidentiary standards to sentencing proceedings and potentially withhold from
the jury evidence that is relevant to the sentencing issue.' 34 In addition to
restricting the admissibility of evidence in the sentencing hearing before the
jury, changes may be necessary in other aspects of the sentencing process. In
Virginia, for example, the final sentencing event requires the sentencing judge
to review the jury's finding of aggravators after he considers the post-sentence
report containing a victim impact statement. 35  The current Virginia law
permits hearsay within the postsentence report,' 36 and by mandating inclusion
of a victim impact statement, the Virginia law effectively requires it.1 37 If
aggravators are elements for purposes of evidentiary rules, the Virginia regime
may no longer be valid because a judge's validation of the jury's determination
that the defendant is death eligible will be based, at least in part, on hearsay
evidence.
While addressing all of these potential changes will undoubtedly be
burdensome on the judiciary and temporarily place capital murder
jurisprudence on shaky ground, these issues do not constitute a valid reason
for denying the import of the Ring decision in the context of double jeopardy.
offer evidence of his own). If aggravators are considered elements of the crime of murder plus
one or more aggravator(s), then the capital-sentencing phase constitutes a trial on a new charge,
and all procedural safeguards should apply to the determination of aggravators.
134. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (explaining that the solution to the
problem presented when evidence relevant to sentencing is prejudicial or otherwise excluded by
the rules of evidence for determination of a defendant's guilt is to bifurcate the trial and "abid[e]
strictly by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt has been
determined open the record to the further information that is relevant to sentence" (quoting
ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 5, at 74-75 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959))). Arguably,
the extension of Ring would require states to cease using a lax evidentiary standard for evidence
of aggravators, but the lower standard would still be permissible as applied to evidence in
mitigation.
135. VA. CODEANN. §19.2-264.5 (2001).
136. O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491, 508 (Va. 1988). The court explained:
During the sentencing phase of a capital murder case, the court may consider
hearsay evidence, favorable or unfavorable to the defendant, contained in a
postsentence report. This is implicit from the language of Code § 19.2-264.5 and
Code §19.2-299, which permit a probation officer "to thoroughly investigate and
report upon the history of the accused and any other and all other relevant facts."
Id.
137. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
FED. R. EviD. 801(c). The Victim Impact Statement required in the post-sentence report in
Virginia capital-sentencing proceedings is a written statement including all relevant information
relating to the impact of the offense upon the victim. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (2001).
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The Court's decision in Ring necessitates each of these changes, and one
cannot reasonably argue that denying the expansion of Ring to the double-
jeopardy context will successfully avoid these issues.1 38 Ring declared that
aggravators are elements of the offense of death-eligible capital murder as a
matter of federal constitutional law, 139 and thus any argument advocating equal
treatment of aggravators and traditional elements of crimes is meritorious and
cannot be circumvented by ignoring the ramifications of Ring in the context of
double jeopardy. If the Court refuses to treat mitigating factors that outweigh
the aggravators as an affirmative defense, the Sattazhan plurality's conclusion
that the jury must reject the existence of aggravators to acquit the defendant of
death is a direct outgrowth of Ring's declaration that aggravators are
elements. 140 This is because absent an affirmative defense, no acquittal results
when all elements of an offense are established.14 ' The Court will not deny this
simply because of the slippery-slope argument that recognition of aggravators
as elements necessitates changes in other areas of the law.
2. Analysis of the Second Requirement-Jury Unanimity in Rejection
of the Aggravators
Just as the plurality's failure to consider the possibility that proving
mitigators that outweigh the aggravators could function as an affirmative
defense undermined its assertion that the jury must reject the aggravators in
order for there to be an acquittal of death, its assertion that the jury rejection
must be unanimous is also flawed. The plurality's insistence that such a
finding be unanimous goes beyond what the law currently requires and
imposes a tougher standard for the acquittal of death than that employed for
acquittals of other offenses. In most jurisdictions, when the defendant faces a
138. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619-20 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Apprendi has "had a severely destabilizing effect on our criminal justice
system" and predicting that the majority's decision in Ring would exacerbate the situation).
139. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003). The Court explained:
[In Ring, the Court] held that aggravating circumstances that make a defendant
eligible for the death penalty "operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of
a greater offense"' [and thus] for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial
guarantee, the underlying offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included offense
of "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances."
Id.
140. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (explaining that, absent an affirmative
defense, the defendant will not be acquitted if all elements of the crime have been established).
141. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (noting that a prosecutor's proof of all
of a crime's elements results in a guilty verdict except in certain circumstances).
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single charge at trial, the jury must unanimously conclude that the prosecution
has failed to prove the elements of the crime to establish an acquittal for the
defendant.1 42 This outcome occurs because the jury must reach a unanimous
verdict, and a hung jury will result if all jurors do not agree that the prosecution
failed to prove its case. 43 When the defendant faces an array of greater and
lesser included offenses and there is doubt as to grade, however, it is impossible
to discern whether the jury unanimously rejected the elements of any greater
offense when it reached a unanimous decision to convict on some lesser
included offense.
Unlike the case in which a defendant faces only one single charge, jurors
deciding on multiple grades of an offense can agree on a unanimous verdict
despite lack of unanimity in rejecting elements of an offense by convicting the
defendant of the highest lesser included offense upon which all jurors
unanimously conclude that all elements have been established. The instructions
given to the jury when it has been presented with more than one grade of
offense or a series of greater and lesser included offenses simply state that the
jury should convict on the lesser offense if it fails to find unanimously that the
prosecution proved the element of the greater offense. Thus, the jury
instructions do not specifically require unanimity in rejecting greater offenses
in order to convict on a lesser included offense. 44 Furthermore, the general
verdict forms used in cases where the defendant faces multiple charges contain
no indication of the makeup of the jury's vote on the decision to reject the
elements of the greater crime. 145 A conviction on the lesser offense could be
the result of a unanimous finding by the jury that the prosecution failed to
142. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (explaining that "when a jury in a
federal court, which operates under the unanimity rule and is instructed to acquit a defendant if
it has a reasonable doubt about his guilt... [,] cannot agree unanimously upon a verdict, the
defendant is not acquitted, but is merely given a new trial") (citations omitted). Although the
federal criminal law and the criminal law of many states require a unanimous verdict for
conviction, state law that does not require unanimous convictions is not a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 359. Thus, in jurisdictions that do not
require a unanimous verdict for conviction, it will be impossible to discern from a general
verdict of not guilty whether the jury was unanimous in concluding the prosecution failed to
prove its case even when the defendant faces only one charge.
143. See id. at 363 (explaining that a hung federal jury results in a new trial rather than an
acquittal).
144. See, e.g., VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction Nos. P33.720,
G33.700 (instructing the jury on "Doubt as to Grade of Offense" and "Lesser Included
Offenses," respectively).
145. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1957) (holding that a
conviction of second-degree murder constitutes an acquittal of murder in the first degree despite
the fact that the general verdict returned by the jury was completely silent on the charge of first-
degree murder).
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prove the elements of the greater offense, or merely a decision by the majority
that the greater elements were not established and an acquiescence on the part
of the minority to convict only on the lower offense. Despite the impossibility
of discerning whether the jury members unanimously rejected the elements of
the greater crimes, our jurisprudence recognizes that a conviction of a lesser
offense constitutes an acquittal of any greater offense.146 By requiring that the
jury's decision on the rejection of the aggravators be unanimous before
recognizing a defendant's life sentence as an acquittal of death, the Sattazahn
plurality creates a more onerous hurdle for capital defendants during the
sentencing phase than that faced by ordinary defendants in trials on the merits.
Requiring more of capital defendants contradicts the long-standing "death
is different" principle that courts traditionally invoke to provide capital
defendants extra procedural protections.147 Rather than giving capital
defendants every benefit of doubt because of the severity and finality of the
punishment that they face, the plurality's test proposes a more stringent
standard for an acquittal of death in capital-sentencing proceedings without
offering any explanation to justify the disparate and harsher treatment. 148 The
lack of a discernable reason to limit the application of this stricter standard to
the capital-sentencing context suggests that adoption of the plurality's test to
capital-sentencing proceedings will call into question the well-established
doctrine of implied acquittal in guilt/innocence proceedings. This unnecessary
departure from prior double-jeopardy jurisprudence will undoubtedly create an
enormous administrative burden for the courts and confuse juries with
additional instructions and requirements.
B. The Likelihood That the New Test Will Become Controlling Law
Despite the shortcomings of Justice Scalia's new standard for what
constitutes an acquittal of death, 149 he obtained the support of both Chief
146. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (explaining the Green decision's
holding that conviction of a lesser included offense constitutes an acquittal of any greater
offenses).
147. See, e.g., Project, Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEo. L.J. 931, 1162-63 (1989) ("The
Court has repeatedly emphasized ... that because of the unique nature of the penalty states are
required to apply stricter procedural safeguards in capital cases than those used in noncapital
cases in order to assure heightened sentencing reliability.").
148. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (explaining why the plurality's testis
harsher than the test for acquittal in traditional guilt/innocence proceedings).
149. See supra Part V.A (exploring the merits of the plurality's proposed test).
1991
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1961 (2004)
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in Part HI of the Sattazahn opinion.
1 50
Justice Scalia, however, failed to persuade a majority to join Part In of his
opinion, and thus his proposition that the jury must unanimously reject the
existence of any aggravating factors to establish an acquittal of death is not
currently controlling law. 151 On the other hand, the possibility exists that more
Justices will adopt the new standard if they are presented with a case that
squarely addresses the conflict between Ring and the Bullington case line. 152
In Sattazahn, the defendant's original jury hung on the issue of death with
nine jurors voting for life in prison and three voting to impose the death
penalty.153 A hung jury on the issue of death does not constitute a jeopardy-
terminating event even under the more lenient test employed in Bullington and
its successors; 154 thus, the Court did not need to consider whether jury
rejection of the aggravators, let alone a unanimous jury rejection of the
aggravators, is a prerequisite to an acquittal of death in light of Ring.
Furthermore, the issues in Sattazahn were convoluted by the fact that the hung
jury triggered imposition of a statutorily-mandated life sentence. 55 If a state
seeks the death penalty on retrial in a case in which the jury unanimously
agreed on a life verdict but either reached that conclusion after finding that the
prosecution proved the aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt or rejected the
aggravators but did not indicate whether that rejection was unanimous, the
Court will be directly confronted with the issues raised by Scalia in the
Sattazahn plurality and would have to either reject or accept, in whole or in
part, the new test proposed therein.
156
150. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-13 (2003).
151. See State V. Mata, 668 N.W.2d 448,480 (Neb. 2003) (noting that because Section III
of the Sattazahn opinion was only joined by three Justices, and thus has not been endorsed by a
majority of the Court, it does not necessarily represent an accurate statement of the law).
152. Judges tend to avoid deciding legal issues until the facts before the court necessitate
such determination. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987) (stating
"[w]e need not decide in this case whether the courts below could have relied solely upon
Lonardo's hearsay statements to determine that a conspiracy had been established by a
preponderance of the evidence" because the case's facts presented other evidence corroborating
the existence of a conspiracy).
153. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05 (stating that the defendant's first jury returned a
note signed by the foreman declaring that they were deadlocked at nine-to-three in favor of life
imprisonment).
154. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the dissent focused on the defendant's
entitlement to the statutorily-imposed life sentence).
155. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104-05 (describing the Pennsylvania law that prescribes a
life sentence in the event of a hung jury on the issue of death).
156. See supra Part IV (explaining the plurality's new definition of the implied acquittal of
death).
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1. Prediction Regarding the Plurality's First Requirement - Rejection
of Aggravators
If a case comes up on appeal in which the jury unanimously sentenced the
defendant to life after having unanimously concluded the prosecution proved
the existence of one or more aggravators, the Court would be forced to consider
the first part of the plurality's test, which requires jury rejection of the
aggravators in order for the defendant to be acquitted and gain double-jeopardy
protection from death. This requirement will become controlling law only if a
majority of the Justices agree that: (1) Ring's classification of aggravators as
elements should be extended to the double-jeopardy context, (2) the use of
mitigating factors to persuade the jury to return a life sentence is not analogous
to the use of an affirmative defense in the guilt/innocence stage and thus cannot
serve to acquit the defendant when the elements of murder plus aggravator(s)
have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) there should not be
an exception created whereby a life sentence returned when the jury
unanimously agreed that the aggravators were proven should provide double-
jeopardy protection even though the sentence does not technically constitute an
acquittal.
There is a very high likelihood that when the Court is directly faced with
the issues raised by the Sattazahn plurality, a majority of the Justices will agree
that aggravators are the functional equivalent of elements within the context of
double jeopardy. Undoubtedly, the three members of the Sattazahn plurality
would reach this conclusion, and several other Justices would be compelled to
concur in this result based on the prior stance in Apprendi and Ring.'
57
Because treating aggravating factors as the functional equivalent of elements
for the purpose of analyzing what constitutes an acquittal of death is the logical
extension of the Court's holding in Ring, those Justices concurring in that
decision will likely agree that a life sentence returned after the jury
unanimously finds one or more aggravators cannot constitute an acquittal of
murder plus one or more aggravators absent an affirmative defense.
58
A majority of the Court, however, may likely conclude that a capital
defendant's use of mitigators is analogous to a defendant's exercise of an
excuse defense in guilt/innocence proceedings and should thus serve as an
affirmative defense, acquitting the defendant of the death penalty when the
157. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (explaining why, in light of Ring, a
jury rejection of the aggravators is a prerequisite to an acquittal of death absent an affirmative
defense negating culpability despite establishment of the aggravators).
158. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (describing the role that aggravators
play in the sentencing stage).
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mitigators are found to outweigh the aggravators despite the fact that all the
elements of murder plus one or more aggravators have been established. None
of the Justices addressed this possibility in Sattazahn, but the portion of the
dissent's opinion that states that it is very unusual for a defendant to prevail by
final judgment without an acquittal lends support to the proposition that the use
of mitigators at a capital-sentencing proceeding to obtain a life sentence
functions as an affirmative defense to death because it would drastically reduce
the number of life sentences that would not constitute an acquittal under the
post-Ring analysis.159 The plurality asserted that, post-Ring, there cannot be an
acquittal of death if the jury unanimously finds the existence of aggravators,
and Justice O'Connor indicates that she too agrees that Ring mandates such a
result.16° These Justices, however, may simply have overlooked the situations
in which affirmative defenses trigger acquittals. If capital defense attorneys
direct the Court's attention to the functional similarities between mitigators in
capital-sentencing proceedings and excuse defenses, a majority may very well
conclude that mitigators serve as an affirmative defense and thus hold that a
capital defendant who was granted a life sentence based on a jury finding that
the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravators is entitled to double-jeopardy
protection from death upon retrial.
Despite the merits of the argument that proof of mitigators outweighing
the aggravators should be treated as an affirmative defense to the death
penalty, if the Court continues to limit its analysis of what constitutes an
acquittal of death to proof on the elements alone or rejects the analogy
between the use of mitigators and excuse defenses, the Sattazahn plurality's
159. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 120 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[tihe standard way for a defendant to secure a final judgment in her favor is to gain
an acquittal" but noting that there are atypical situations in which a defendant prevails by final
judgment without being acquitted, which are recognized by double-jeopardy jurisprudence).
160. Id. at 116 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text (explaining the plurality's assertion that there cannot be an acquittal if the jury does not
reject the aggravating factors). O'Connor stated in her dissent:
I do not join Part III, which would further extend the reach of Apprendi because I
continue to believe that case was wrongly decided .... It remains my view that
"Apprendi's rule that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated
as an element of the crime is not required by the Constitution, by history, or by our
prior cases."... [Thus] I would resolve petitioner's double jeopardy claim...
under Bullington.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,619 (2002)). From this
statement, one can infer that O'Connor agrees with the plurality's proposition that the analysis
of what constitutes an acquittal of death must be altered in light of Ring, but declines to join
only because she disagrees with Ring itself.
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assertion that the jury must reject the aggravators in order for there to be an
acquittal of death will likely become controlling law. 161 Nonetheless, a
majority of the Court could conceivably agree that the jury must reject the
existence of one or more aggravators to reach an acquittal of death and still
hold that a jury-rendered life sentence provides double-jeopardy protection by
carving out an exception under which all jury-rendered life sentences terminate
jeopardy even if the sentence is not actually an acquittal.
In Sattazahn, the dissent noted that jeopardy can terminate in situations
other than acquittals and concluded that a state-mandated life sentence when
the jury deadlocks on the sentencing issue is an example of such a situation.'
62
To justify the decision to afford double-jeopardy protection to Sattazahn despite
the lack of an acquittal on the merits, the dissent noted that (1) the majority's
holding denying double-jeopardy protection "confront[ed] the defendant with a
perilous choice" between facing death on retrial or foregoing a potentially
meritorious appeal, and (2) the death penalty is unique in its severity and
finality, thus heightening a defendant's interests in avoiding a second
prosecution. 163 Arguably, both of these considerations would apply to a case in
which the jury returned a life verdict after concluding that the prosecution
established the existence of one or more aggravators.164 Although only four
Justices were willing to provide double-jeopardy protection to Sattazahn
when the jury could not agree on a sentence and life was judicially
imposed, 65 it is possible that more members of the Court would be inclined
to vote in favor of an exception providing double-jeopardy protection despite the
161. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (explaining why, in light of Ring, a
jury rejection of the aggravators is a prerequisite to an acquittal of death absent an affirmative
defense negating culpability despite establishment of the aggravators).
162. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme
Court's "decisions recognize that jeopardy can terminate in circumstances other than an
acquittal" and concluding that "once the trial court entered a final judgment of life for Sattazahn,
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty a second time"
even though entry of that life sentence was not technically an acquittal).
163. See id. at 126-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that in the decision to give
Sattazahn jeopardy protection, the dissent gave weight to two considerations: (1) holding
otherwise would confront the defendant with a perilous choice, and (2) the punishment of death
is "'unique in both its severity and its finality"' (quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721,
732 (1998))).
164. If the defendant in such a case wished to appeal his conviction, under the plurality's
test he would have to forego the life sentence returned by the jury and potentially face the severe
and final penalty of death. See id. at 112 (explaining that the only way a defendant's life
sentence would protect him from death on retrial is if it was the result of the jury's unanimous
conclusion that one or more aggravators were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
165. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Sattazahn dissent).
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lack of an acquittal when the life sentence represents the jury's unanimous
conclusion that the death penalty is inappropriate. The Sattazahn majority's
sharp criticism of the dissenting opinion, however, suggests that this outcome
will not occur.66
2. Prediction Regarding the Plurality's Second Requirement-Unanimity
in the Rejection ofAggravators
Although a majority of the Court will likely accept the Sattazahn
plurality's assertion that the jury must reject the existence of the aggravators in
order for a life sentence to provide double-jeopardy protection (at least absent
any affirmative defense), Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas will have a
difficult time convincing a majority to hold that the jury must unanimously
reject the aggravators to trigger double-jeopardy protection on the issue of
death. As noted above, requiring unanimous rejection of the aggravators is a
stricter standard than that applied in guilt/innocence proceedings, where
conviction of a lesser included offense constitutes an implied acquittal of any
greater offense without any inquiry into the unanimity of the jury's conclusion
that the prosecution failed to prove all of the elements of the greater crime.' 67
166. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113 (stating that the statement upon which the dissent
relied to justify affording jeopardy protection to the nonacquittal life sentence at issue was
nothing more than dictum and was a "thin reed on which to rest" the dissent's conclusion).
167. Supra Part V.A.2. One could possibly argue that because all facts necessary to
sentence a capital defendant to life imprisonment have been established beyond a reasonable
doubt at the trial on the merits, the capital-sentencing proceeding is more closely analogous to a
trial on the merits in which the defendant faces only one charge (death-eligible capital murder)
and thus requiring jury unanimity in rejection of the elements of that charge in order for the
defendant to establish an acquittal is no more difficult than what is asked of an ordinary
defendant. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (explaining that in a guilt/innocence
proceeding where the defendant faces a single charge the jury must unanimously conclude that
the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime in order for there to be an acquittal).
This argument, however, ignores the prior case law analogizing capital-sentencing proceedings
to trials on the merits in which the defendant faces greater and lesser included offenses and
receives an implied acquittal of greater offenses upon conviction of a lesser included offense
without inquiry into the unanimity of the jury's rejection of the elements of the greater offenses.
See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445-47 (1981) (treating a jury life sentence as an
implied acquittal of the death penalty). Although Ring may have challenged the strength of this
analogy by explaining that the defendant is being tried for the single offense of capital murder
plus one or more aggravators at the sentencing proceeding, the capital-sentencing proceeding in
which the defendant receives a life sentence is still more similar to a guilt/innocence proceeding
where the defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense than a guilt/innocence proceeding
where the defendant is acquitted of the single crime with which he was charged and sent home a
free man. Therefore, requiring unanimous rejection of the aggravators in order for a life
sentence to constitute an acquittal of death is clearly a tougher showing than that required of
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Because of the heightened procedural protection typically provided to capital
defendants, it is unlikely that a majority of the Court would adopt a test that
makes it more difficult for a capital defendant than an ordinary defendant to
prove an acquittal.168  Moreover, a majority of the Court is unlikely to
determine that the stricter test proposed by the Sattazahn plurality should be
applied to implied acquittals in guilt/innocence proceedings to cure the
disparate treatment that would arise from limiting its application to capital-
sentencing proceedings because the criterion for what constitutes an implied
acquittal in guilt/innocence proceedings is well established and workable.
1 69
Thus, the portion of the plurality's test requiring that the jury's rejection of the
aggravators be unanimous to establish an acquittal of death will not likely gain
the support of a Court majority.
Therefore, this Note predicts that a majority of the Court (1) will not adopt
the portion of the plurality's test requiring unanimous rejection of the
aggravators;170 (2) will hold that the plurality's assertion that the jury must
reject the aggravators in order for there to be an acquittal of death and double-
jeopardy protection is true absent an affirmative defense;' 7 ' and (3) will
recognize proof of sufficient mitigators as an affirmative defense, resulting in
acquittal despite proof of aggravators.172 This statement, however, is merely a
prediction and illustrates only one possible way the Court could resolve the
uncertainty of what constitutes an acquittal of death after the Ring decision.
When presented with a case that squarely presents the issues introduced
by the Sattazahn plurality, the Court may reject the plurality's test altogether
and reaffirm the acquittal of death test proposed in Bullington, require
rejection of aggravators for an acquittal of death but not unanimity in the
rejection, or agree that Ring indeed narrows the situations in which a life
sentence constitutes an acquittal but carve out a category of situations in
which a nonacquittal provides double-jeopardy protection. The Court may
also decide to adopt the plurality's test as stated in Sattazahn. Because of the
ordinary defendants in an analogous trial on the issue of guilt.
168. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (describing the death is different
principle).
169. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing Green v. United States, in
which the Supreme Court first established the test for an implied acquittal in guilt/innocence
proceedings).
170. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (stating why it is unlikely that the
Court will adopt the test requiring unanimous rejection of the aggravators).
171. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of treating
mitigating factors as affirmative defenses).
172. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (noting the possibility that a majority
would consider mitigators to act as affirmative defenses to the death penalty).
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uncertainty involved in the future of the death acquittal standard and the
unique severity and finality of the punishment, capital defense attorneys must
explore the ramifications of adoption of the plurality's test by the majority so as
not to inadvertently risk their defendants' lives by winning an appeal.
VI. Ramifications of the Sattazahn Plurality's New Test If Adopted by a
Majority of the Court
The current verdict forms employed in capital-sentencing proceedings are
insufficient to preserve the information necessary to establish an acquittal of
death if the plurality's test is adopted in full. 173 Although this Note concludes
that the likelihood of the plurality's test becoming controlling law is not great,
the small chance that it will be adopted by a majority of the Court is enough to
merit caution on the part of defense counsel, given the severity and finality of
the penalty at stake. Given the uncertainty in what is necessary to establish an
acquittal of death in a post-Ring world, capital defense attorneys must make
every effort to change the verdict forms to maximize a defendant's ability to
establish the requisite elements of an acquittal of death under any test the Court
may adopt.
A. The Current Inadequacy of Capital Murder Verdict Forms
Although capital-sentencing verdict forms are not uniform among
jurisdictions, an analysis of model capital verdict forms from several
jurisdictions reveals that they are generally organized to solicit one of three
responses from the jury: (1) the jury did not find aggravators and thus
sentenced the defendant to life, (2) the jury unanimously found one or more
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt thus making the
defendant death eligible but set punishment at life after considering all the
evidence in aggravation and mitigation, or (3) the jury unanimously found one
or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and after
considering all the evidence in aggravation and mitigation decided to set
punishment at death. 74 This minimal specificity is more than enough to
173. See supra Part V.A (providing a legal analysis of the plurality's test).
174. See, e.g., KY. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 12.1OA (1999) (setting forth one verdict form
which simply states "we, the jury, fix the Defendant's punishment... at confinement in the
penitentiary for life" and another form which would be used by the jury when they find
aggravating factors which states that the jury found "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
following aggravating circumstances or circumstances exist," leaves a space for the jurors to list
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establish an acquittal of death under Bullington because, under that test, all that
is required to establish an acquittal of death is a jury-rendered life sentence.1
75
In light of the Sattazahn plurality and the doubt it casts on the Bullington test,
however, capital defense attorneys must advocate verdict forms that provide
more insight into jury findings underlying life sentences. 1
76
A closer look at Virginia's capital-sentencing verdict forms illustrates
the ways in which current sentencing phase verdict forms are insufficient to
ensure preservation of a defendant's acquittal of death in this time of
uncertainty. In each capital-sentencing proceeding in Virginia, the jury is
provided with: (1) at least two verdict forms on which it could return a life
sentence, and (2) one on which it could return a death sentence. 77 An
analysis of the two types of verdict forms provided in each case for returning
a life sentence reveals that courts are currently not demanding enough
specificity about the rationale for jurors' life sentences to ensure protection of
capital defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause after the Ring
decision. The jury uses the first type of life sentence verdict form if it finds
that the Commonwealth failed to prove an aggravating circumstance. 178 This
form simply states that the jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder
in the guilt/innocence proceeding and fixes the punishment at life after
consideration of all the evidence in aggravation and mitigation. 179 The jury
uses the second type of life sentence verdict form when it unanimously finds that
the prosecution has proved one or both of the statutory aggravators beyond a
the specific aggravators found, and leaves a space for the jury to select the appropriate
punishment).
175. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text (setting forth the Bullington test for
what constitutes an acquittal of death).
176. The problems with lack of specificity in verdict forms may be more or less severe
depending on the jurisdiction, as verdict forms vary.
177. See VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction Nos. P33.130-P33.130G
(2003) (noting the required verdict forms that must be provided to a capital jury in Virginia).
The Virginia Model Jury Instructions provide seven verdict forms for capital-sentencing
proceedings. In each case, the jury will be given form P33.130A, which is the form the jury will
use to return its sentencing verdict if it finds that the Commonwealth failed to prove aggravating
circumstances. Id. at Criminal Instruction No. P33.130A. In addition to this form, the jury will
be given up to three forms to return a life sentence after proving the existence of one or both of
Virginia's statutory aggravators-vileness and future dangerousness. One of these forms states
that the jury found vileness unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt, the second future
dangerousness, and the third both. Which of these forms the jury receives will depend upon the
evidence of aggravators offered at trial. Id. Similarly, the jury will be given up to three forms
on which to return a death sentence. Id. at Criminal Instruction No. P33.130.
178. Id. at Criminal Instruction No. P33.130A.
179. Id.
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reasonable doubt but nonetheless decides to fix the punishment at life. 80 This
type of life sentence verdict form states that the jury found unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt against the applicable aggravator(s) and fixed the
punishment at life after "having considered all the evidence in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense." 181
The first problem with these verdict forms is that the form used by the jury
when it rejects the aggravators is insufficient to preserve an acquittal of death
under the Sattazahn plurality's test. If a majority of the Court adopts the
plurality's test in full, a life-sentenced defendant who successfully appeals his
conviction can be retried for death unless the verdict form demonstrates that the
jury acquitted him of death by unanimously finding that the aggravators were
not proven.1 82 By not returning the second type of verdict form listing the
relevant aggravating circumstances, the jury indicates that it did not
unanimously find the existence of any aggravators, 183 but this rejection is
equivocal. The rejection could mean that some jurors found the aggravator
proven while others did not, which would not constitute an acquittal under the
plurality's test. It could also mean that the jury was unanimous in finding that
the aggravator was not proven, which would constitute an acquittal under the
plurality's test. Therefore, while this verdict form would be sufficient to
establish an acquittal if a majority of the Court adopts only the first part of the
plurality's test requiring rejection of the aggravators, it would not suffice to
establish an acquittal of death if the majority also agrees with the plurality's
contention that the rejection of the aggravators must be unanimous.'84 If capital
defense attorneys do not object to the use of these forms and insist that the jury
disclose its finding specifically, capital defendants receiving life verdicts after
the jury unanimously rejected the aggravators will be deprived of their right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to avoid retrial for their lives following a
successful appeal of the underlying conviction if the plurality's test is adopted
in full. This result will occur because capital defendants will not be able to
establish the requisite unanimity from the jury's verdict.
The second problem with these verdict forms is that the form used by the
jury when it sentences the defendant to life after unanimously finding the
180. Id. at Criminal Instruction Nos. P33.130B-130D.
181. Id.
182. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112 (2003) (opining that "if petitioner's
first sentencing jury had unanimously concluded that Pennsylvania failed to prove any
aggravating circumstances, that conclusion would operate as an 'acquittal' of the greater
offense").
183. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction No. P33.130 (2003).
184. See supra Part IV.B-C (discussing the requirements of the Satazahn plurality's test).
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existence of one or more aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt would be
insufficient to establish an acquittal if the Court holds that proof of sufficient
mitigators serves as an affirmative defense. The form currently used when the
jury sentences the defendant to life after finding the existence of aggravators
simply states that the decision to sentence the defendant to life was based on
consideration of "all the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the
offense." 85 This vague language does not indicate whether the life sentence
was based on a jury finding that the defendant established mitigating factors
that outweighed the aggravators or on a jury determination that death was
inappropriate even though the defendant did not establish sufficient mitigating
factors.186 If capital defense attorneys do not demand that juries disclose their
findings on mitigators specifically, capital defendants in jurisdictions that do
not require a death sentence when aggravators and no mitigators are proven will
be unable to establish that the jury found the requisite mitigating factors should
the Court recognize that finding as grounds for an acquittal of death.
B. Proposed Solution-New Verdict Forms for Capital Sentencing
Although the lack of specificity in current capital-sentencing verdict
forms will only create a problem for capital defendants if a majority of the
Court holds that a divergence from the previous test of what constitutes an
acquittal is mandated by the Ring decision and announces a test requiring
heightened specificity, the probability that Ring will have at least some effect
on the test is high. 87 While it is unlikely that a majority of the Court will
185. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction Nos. P33.130B-i30D (2003).
186. In Virginia, the jury is not required to sentence the defendant to death when it finds
the existence of aggravators and the absence of mitigators. See VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
Criminal Instruction No. 33.122 (2003) (explaining that even if the jury finds that the
prosecution has proved the aggravators, "if [the jury] nevertheless believe[s] from all the
evidence, including evidence in mitigation, that the death penalty is not justified, then [the jury]
shall fix the punishment of the defendant" at life). Thus, a life verdict returned after the jury
finds the existence of aggravators could be the result of a finding that the defendant proved
sufficient mitigating factors that negate those aggravators or simply a determination by the jury
that death was not warranted despite the absence of mitigators. This confusion would not result,
however, in jurisdictions mandating a death sentence when the jury finds that one or more
aggravators were established beyond a reasonable doubt and no mitigators were proven or when
the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravators that outweighs any mitigators because in
such a case, all life sentences returned after the jury found the aggravators were necessarily
based on a jury finding of sufficient mitigators. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 971 I(c)(1)(iv) (2004) (setting forth this type of capital-sentencing scheme).
187. See supra Part V.B (discussing the likelihood that a Court majority will adopt some or
all of the plurality's test in light of Ring).
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adopt the Sattazahn plurality's test in full,1 88 the plurality introduced some of
the implications of Ring within the context of double jeopardy and illuminated
the need for change in the test of what constitutes an acquittal of death.1
8 9
Capital defense attorneys must heed this warning and advocate special verdict
forms now so that their clients will have the information necessary to establish
an acquittal of death no matter how the standard evolves in the near future.
In order for defendants to establish an acquittal of death if the test
proposed in the Sattazahn plurality becomes controlling law, verdict forms
must disclose whether jury rejection of the aggravators was unanimous. 19 To
achieve this level of specificity, this Note proposes that capital defense
attorneys advocate the use of a verdict form that requires the jury to select one
of three alternatives: (1) that the jury found unanimously that the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of aggravator(s) beyond a reasonable doubt,
(2) that the jury did not find unanimously that the prosecution proved the
existence of aggravator(s) beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) that the jury found
unanimously that the prosecution proved the existence of aggravator(s) beyond
a reasonable doubt. If this verdict form is employed, capital defendants who
receive a life sentence after the jury unanimously rejects the aggravators can
easily establish their legal entitlement to that life sentence should the Sattazahn
plurality's test become controlling law.
The second contingency requiring more specificity in the verdict forms is
the possibility that the Court will not only acknowledge the import of Ring and
thus treat aggravators as elements for purposes of analyzing what constitutes an
acquittal, but that it will also recognize proof of mitigators as an affirmative
defense. Under such a rule, a capital defendant who received a life sentence
after the jury unanimously found the existence of one or more aggravators
would need to prove that the life sentence was the result of a jury finding that
the defense established sufficient mitigators, rather than mere jury sympathy.'91
To achieve this specificity, capital defense attorneys should request that the
verdict forms used by the jury to return a life sentence when it
unanimously finds the prosecution proved the aggravator(s) beyond a
188. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (predicting the Court's likely
resolution of the issues raised by the Sattazahn plurality).
189. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111-12 (2003) (explaining that Ring
has illuminated the part of our jurisprudence dealing with what constitutes an acquittal of death
and subsequently proposing a new standard).
190. See supra Part IV.B-C (discussing the requirements of the plurality's test of what
constitutes an acquittal of death).
191. See supra notes 113-27 and accompanying text (introducing the effects of a rule that
would treat proof of sufficient mitigators as an affirmative defense).
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reasonable doubt require the jury to indicate whether it found that the defense
established the existence of sufficient mitigating factors under the applicable
evidentiary standard. 1
92
Unfortunately, requesting this level of specificity injury verdict forms will
not ensure their use in capital-sentencing proceedings given that the law in its
current state does not require more than simply showing a jury-rendered life
sentence to establish an acquittal of death. While there is no constitutional bar
to special verdicts in criminal proceedings when the defendant requests such a
verdict, 193 judges nonetheless tend to resist the use of special verdicts.
94
Commentators attribute this resistance to the fact that special verdicts raise the
constitutional issue of interfering with jury deliberation and can serve to
preclude jury nullification. 195 This problem is arguably not a concern in the
192. This solution to the proof problems associated with recognition of sufficient
mitigators as an affirmative defense assumes that if a majority of the Court agrees that mitigators
should serve to produce an acquittal, they will reject the plurality's contention that an acquittal
of death based on rejection of aggravators must be unanimous. Presumably, if the Court does
hold that an acquittal of death based on rejection of aggravators must be the result of a
unanimous rejection of the aggravators and also recognizes mitigators as an affirmative defense,
the jury forms used when the jury returns a life verdict based on non-unanimous rejection of
aggravators must also disclose whether the jury found the defense proved sufficient mitigators in
all jurisdictions that permit life sentences when aggravators are established and mitigators are
either not found or not sufficient to overcome those aggravators. This is so because under the
unanimity test for acquittal based on rejection of aggravators, a non-unanimous rejection of the
aggravators would not qualify as an acquittal absent an affirmative defense. Requiring the jury
to disclose its findings with regard to mitigators when it finds that the prosecution failed to
prove aggravators would introduce many practical problems because under current law the jury
does not make any findings as to mitigators unless and until it unanimously concludes the
prosecution has proved the existence of one or more aggravators. See, e.g., VA. MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction No. P33.127 (2003) ("If you find the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, in determining
the appropriate punishment you shall consider any mitigation evidence .... ) (emphasis added).
Because it is very unlikely that the Court would draw the analogy to the excuse defenses used in
trials on guilt or innocence but ignore the analogy to implied acquittals in trials on guilt or
innocence where unanimity in rejection of aggravators is not required, this possibility and the
complications that would arise therefrom are beyond the scope of this Note.
193. See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government
Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1013 n.44 (1980) ("Nor is there
presumably any constitutional bar to their [special verdicts'] use in criminal cases at a
defendant's request.").
194. See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MicHL. REv. 2381,2436
(1999) ("Special verdicts.., are disfavored in criminal cases.").
195. See WAYNE LAFAVE Er AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.10(a), at 1167 (4th ed. 2004)
(explaining that special verdicts are disfavored in criminal trials because "[t]he general verdict
facilitates jury independence by allowing the jury to sidestep the outcome that may follow
inescapably from a careful dissection of the crime for each of the factual elements dictated by
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situation at hand, however, because in most jurisdictions the jury is free to
sentence the defendant to life regardless of the findings on aggravators and
mitigators, which eliminates the potential barrier to jury nullification.
1 96
Furthermore, many courts will allow special findings when defendants request
them. 197 Ultimately, a capital defense attorney should request these special
verdict forms regardless of the trial judge's expected response. By making the
request and placing an objection on the record in the event that the judge denies
the request, a capital defense attorney preserves this issue for later
consideration by the appellate court in the event that a majority of the Court
adopts a narrower test of what constitutes an acquittal requiring more
specificity in jury verdicts.' 98
VII. Conclusion
The Sattazahn plurality was correct in asserting that the Ring decision
affects how the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to capital-sentencing
proceedings, but the Court probably will not accept the plurality's contention
that, in light of that decision, no acquittal exists unless the jury unanimously
rejects the aggravating factors.199 Ring's declaration that aggravators are the
functional equivalent of elements must change the way we evaluate acquittal of
death, but we need only look to the way elements of other crimes are treated in
traditional trials to determine what this change entails. The Sattazahn
plurality's test for what constitutes an acquittal of murder plus one or more
law"); Kate H. Nepveu, Note, Beyond "Guilty" or "Not Guilty": Giving Special Verdicts in
Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 263, 264 (2003) (explaining that the use of
special verdicts and special interrogatories raises "the constitutional issue of interfering with
jury deliberations").
196. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that many jurisdictions do not
require the jury to return death under any circumstances but noting that Pennsylvania does
require a death sentence if the jury finds that the aggravators sufficiently outweigh any
mitigators).
197. SeeLAFAVEETAL.,supranote 195, § 24.10(a), at 1168 ("Many courts also will allow
special findings when a defendant requests such findings.").
198. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1042 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (explaining
how an attorney may preserve an issue for appeal). The court stated:
To preserve an issue at trial for later consideration by an appellate court, one must
raise an objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the opposing party
of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will later be sought. A
general objection or an objection on other grounds will not suffice.
Id.
199. See supra Part V (analyzing the plurality's test).
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aggravator(s) varies significantly from what our jurisprudence requires for an
acquittal of an offense in guilt/innocence proceedings and therefore will likely
be rejected.
The plurality's test departs from the test of acquittal in guilt/innocence
proceedings in two significant ways. First, requiring unanimity in the rejection
of the aggravators would impose a tougher standard than that which is applied
in traditional cases on guilt or innocence, in which a defendant receives an
implied acquittal of the greater offense when he is convicted of the lesser
offense without any inquiry into the jury's findings on the elements of the
greater offense. 2° Second, although jury rejection of elements is required for
an acquittal in guilt/innocence proceedings absent an affirmative defense, when
a defendant proves an affirmative defense, he will receive an acquittal of his
crime even though the elements were established. 20 1 The capital defendant's
proof of sufficient mitigating factors is analogous to an excuse defense in
guilt/innocence trials, and thus, by failing to recognize that proof of mitigators
could produce an acquittal despite the proof of aggravators, the plurality
imposes on the capital defendant a greater burden than is faced by an ordinary
defendant on trial for a less serious crime.202 Rather than requiring unanimous
rejection of aggravators, the most logical way to incorporate Ring into the
analysis of what constitutes an acquittal of death is to require the defendant to
show either that (1) the jury, unanimously or otherwise, rejected the
aggravators, or (2) the defendant proved mitigators that the jury found
sufficient to outweigh or negate the aggravators.
While this solution would allow for the most symmetry between the
definition of acquittal of the charged offense and the definition of acquittal of
death, we have no guarantee that the Court will follow this course. For this
reason, capital defense attorneys must ensure that their verdict forms include
enough information to meet the test adopted by the Sattazahn plurality
opinion and any other test the Court may adopt. Not only must verdict forms
disclose whether the jury found sufficient mitigators when returning a life
sentence after finding aggravators, the forms must also disclose whether the
jury's rejection of the aggravating factors was unanimous when returning a life
200. See supra Part V.A.2 (explaining how the plurality's insistence that rejection of
aggravators be unanimous to establish an acquittal goes beyond what the law currently requires
and imposes a tougher standard for the acquittal of death than that employed for acquittals of
other offenses).
201. See supra Part V.A. 1 (explaining how an affirmative defense will acquit a defendant
even though all elements of an offense are established and noting the ways in which mitigating
circumstances are analogous to affirmative defenses).
202. See supra Part V.A (exploring the ramifications of the Sattazahn plurality's test).
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sentence based on rejection of aggravators. 20 3 Only with this level of
specificity will the verdict forms be adequate to preserve the information
necessary to establish an acquittal of death under any test the Court may
ultimately adopt.
203. See supra Part VI.B (proposing specified verdict forms).
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